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NOTES 
THE FLAWED EXPLICIT SAFETY NET:  HOW 
FEDERALLY SPONSORED DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTES TO FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Nicholas J. Colombo* 
 
In the spring of 2012, JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JP Morgan), one of the 
largest and most profitable banks in the United States, made a $6 billion 
mistake.  The issues all began in London, with a division of JP Morgan 
known as the Chief Investment Office (CIO).  While the CIO’s stated 
purpose was to use excess deposits to hedge against interest rate risk, it had 
in fact been responsible for earning approximately $4 billion in profits for 
JP Morgan over the three previous years.  This all came to a screeching 
halt when Bruno Iksil, now known as the “London Whale,” took a series of 
high-risk positions in derivatives and credit default swaps (CDS).  To date 
the incident has cost JP Morgan billions of dollars in losses and fines and 
resulted in the criminal prosecution of several individuals involved in the 
incident. 
Politicians and commentators have held the London Whale incident up 
as another example of large complex financial institutions behaving badly, 
and have accordingly pushed for stronger measures to eliminate the 
implicit subsidies that make such entities and their bad behavior possible.  
Lacking from this debate has been any meaningful discussion of the impact 
that explicit subsidies, like deposit insurance, have on the financial system 
in the United States.  This is despite the fact that the funds the CIO used to 
make such fantastic profits for JP Morgan were federally sponsored 
deposits.  This Note describes how the explicit federal safety net, 
specifically federally sponsored deposit insurance, contributes to the 
creation of financial instability and, potentially, financial crisis.  This Note 
then analyzes several proposed reforms that could alleviate these problems, 
 
*  I would like to thank Professor Zephyr Teachout for her invaluable guidance during the 
writing of this Note, Professor Richard Scott Carnell for taking the time to explain to me the 
intricacies of the regulation of financial institutions, my parents for reminding me that 
publishing something is a worthwhile endeavor, my grandparents for spending many years in 
difficult blue-collar jobs so that I could one day have the privilege of sitting comfortably in a 
library conducting academic research, my friends for being supportive and showing an 
interest in my work, and Ms. Laura Bryant for spending many a late night listening to me 
discuss highly esoteric aspects of the law of deposit insurance.  
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and, while continually advocating for increased attention to this issue, 
ultimately suggests a system of narrow depository institutions to solve it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2012, Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase and 
Co. (JP Morgan), one of the largest and most profitable banks in the United 
States, announced that the bank had made a mistake1—a $6 billion 
mistake.2  The issues all began in London with a division of JP Morgan 
known as the Chief Investment Office (CIO).3  The purpose of the CIO 
seemed entirely mundane.  It used excess deposits to hedge against interest 
rate risk,4 or as JP Morgan itself described, the CIO “‘[i]s focused on 
managing the long-term structural assets and liabilities of the firm and is 
 
 1. Dan Fitzpatrick, Gregory Zuckerman & Liz Rappaport, J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion 
Blunder—Bank Admits Losses on Massive Trading Bet Gone Wrong; Dimon’s Mea Culpa, 
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at A1. 
 2. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Charges Against 2 Traders Fault JP 
Morgan for Lack of Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A1. 
 3. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach 
$9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 28, 2012, 2:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/. 
 4. Id. 
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not focused on short-term profits.’”5  At the same time, this apparently did 
not stop the CIO from generating short-term profits, as it reportedly earned 
JP Morgan $4 billion in profits during the three previous years.6  This all 
changed, however, when Bruno Iksil, now known as the “London Whale,” 
took a series of high-risk positions in credit derivatives.7  These positions 
turned out to be a mistake, a mistake that has to date cost JP Morgan 
approximately $6 billion in losses, several billion in fines, and has resulted 
in criminal charges being filed against two other traders in the CIO.8 
Politicians and commentators quickly decried the incident as another 
example of the problems with large complex financial institutions (LCFIs).9  
They argued that big banks like JP Morgan are incentivized to engage in 
excessively risky activities because they are protected by an implicit 
government safety net known as “too big to fail” (TBTF).10  What was 
virtually ignored, however, was the fact that the CIO made all of its high-
risk investments and profits using excess deposits.11  These deposits were 
insured by the federal government under a program known as deposit 
insurance, a government program that, as part of the explicit federal safety 
net for banks,12 allows commercial banks like JP Morgan to acquire funds 
at an artificially low price, essentially amounting to a federal subsidy.13  In 
other words, one could just as easily argue that JP Morgan was incentivized 
to make risky investments through the CIO because of the federal subsidy 
provided by deposit insurance. 
This Note will describe how the explicit federal safety net, specifically 
federally sponsored deposit insurance, contributes to the creation of 
financial instability and, potentially, financial crisis.  Part I describes the 
history of deposit insurance in the United States and how it functions 
currently.  It also discusses the history of banking in the United States and 
how banks became a part of the LCFIs that dominate the financial services 
industry today.  Part II of this Note describes how federally sponsored 
deposit insurance creates perverse incentives for banks to engage in certain 
high-risk activities and offers some examples of the repercussions.  Part III 
examines several potential solutions to this problem, including possible 
 
 5. Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, “London Whale” Rattles Debt Market, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2012, at A1. 
 6. See Silver-Greenberg & Craig, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2. 
 9. Scott Patterson, “Whale” Capsized Banks’ Rule Effort, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, 
at C1. 
 10. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act:  A Flawed and Inadequate Response 
to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011).  Under this theory, big 
banks are able to engage in highly speculative activities because they enjoy protection from 
an implicit government safety net, and expect that the government will bail them out with 
public funds in a crisis. 
 11. See Silver-Greenberg & Craig, supra note 3. 
 12. The explicit federal safety net consists of federally sponsored deposit insurance, the 
Federal Reserve’s discount lending window, and the Federal Reserve’s payment system.  See 
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1023 n.308. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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legal adjustments to deposit insurance, restrictions on the abilities of banks, 
and reforms to the entire structure of the banking and financial services 
industry.  Finally, Part IV of this Note offers a set of reforms to the law 
designed to eliminate perverse incentives, protect depositors, increase 
economic stability, and encourage profitability for banks and financial 
institutions. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE, BANKS, 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
This Part discusses all of the relevant background information regarding 
deposit insurance in the United States.  Part I.A provides an exhaustive 
history of deposit insurance in the United States from the early 1800s to the 
present, as well as the history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC).  It concludes with a discussion of the changes made by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 
including the creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority.  Part I.B 
provides a detailed description of the way deposit insurance currently 
operates in the United States.  Part I.C describes the laws that allowed 
banks to develop into LCFIs, and Part I.D details the laws, known as 
sections 23A and 23B, that govern the interactions between banks, their 
affiliates, and subsidiaries within LCFIs. 
A.  A Tale As Old As Time:  The History of Deposit Insurance 
in the United States 
This Part provides an exhaustive history of deposit insurance in the 
United States from the early 1800s to the present, as well as the history of 
the FDIC.  Part I.A.1 discusses why a system of deposit insurance is 
necessary.  Part I.A.2 illustrates how early systems of deposit insurance 
worked in the United States, and Part I.A.3 describes how a federally 
sponsored deposit insurance system was ultimately created in the United 
States.  Lastly, Parts I.A.4 and I.A.5 systematically review all of the 
legislative changes that have been made to the system since its inception, 
including those contained in Dodd-Frank. 
1.  Don’t Let the Depositors Run Out on Me:  Why Banks 
Need Deposit Insurance 
Prior to 1863, virtually all banks were state-chartered institutions.14  The 
National Banking Act of 186315 changed that by establishing a national 
banking charter and creating the dual banking system that still exists in the 
United States today.16  Banks are generally institutions of limited power, 
 
 14. See DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41181, PERMISSIBLE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS UNDER THE GLASS-
STEAGALL ACT (GSA) AND THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT (GLBA) 3 (2010). 
 15. National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. 
 16. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 3. 
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and both their charters and the law limit their activities to the “business of 
banking.”17  Structurally, banks are institutions that present unique 
challenges.  First, they are highly leveraged entities that hold assets much 
less liquid than their liabilities.18  Specifically, banks fund loans that are 
illiquid and difficult to value with deposits that are withdrawable upon 
demand,19 and keep relatively little cash on reserve, usually only enough to 
meet customers’ anticipated demand.20  Second, banks are incredibly 
important to the national economy, providing a place for citizens to store 
their savings and furnishing loans to finance businesses.21 
This creates the potential for a problem.  If depositors withdraw more 
cash than anticipated, and do so without giving the bank sufficient time to 
liquefy its assets, the result will be a bank failure.22  Most of the time, banks 
are accurately able to anticipate depositor demand and maintain enough 
cash on hand.23  However, even the best calculations and preparations are 
rendered moot in a panic.  If depositors for some reason come to believe 
that their bank is at risk of collapsing, many of them, even those who had 
not planned to, will rush to the bank to withdraw their funds.24  This is 
known as a bank run.25  The result, regardless of whether the bank was 
financially troubled or not, is a bank failure.26  If the panic is widespread 
and several banks fail, the subsequent shock to the banking industry can 
cause widespread economic turmoil.27 
The primary goal of deposit insurance, therefore, is to create stability in 
the banking industry by helping to prevent the panic that leads to bank runs 
in the first place.28  The plan operates under the hope that by providing 
insurance for depositors’ funds, depositors will be less fearful of a bank’s 
health, less likely to run on banks, and less likely to cause unnecessary bank 
failures.29  Furthermore, a system of federally sponsored deposit insurance 
 
 17. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012).  The Office of Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) has broad authority to determine what constitutes the “business of banking.” See 
NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2 (1995).  Many 
banks also exist under the corporate structure of a Financial Holding Company (FHC).  
FHCs are permitted to engage in a wide variety of finance-related activities entirely 
unrelated to commercial banking.  Thus, banks within a FHC become affiliated with other 
financial institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012). 
 18. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 309 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000:  Competition, 
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 309. 
 19. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309. 
 20. See id. at 309. 
 21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 8 (2009). 
 22. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309. 
 23. See id. at 309. 
 24. See id. at 309–10. 
 25. See id. at 309. 
 26. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309. 
 27. See also Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 309. 
 28. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 310. 
 29. See id. at 310. 
2013] THE FLAWED EXPLICIT SAFETY NET 1243 
is considered preferable because the federal government’s vast financial 
resources allow it to instill a high level of confidence, which is necessary to 
make a deposit insurance system effective.30  A secondary goal of deposit 
insurance is to protect small depositors.31 
2.  Tonight We’re Going To Party Like It’s 1829:  Early Systems of 
Deposit Insurance in the United States 
The early systems of deposit insurance in the United States can be broken 
down roughly into two periods:  those created in the period from 1829 to 
1866, and those created in the period from 1908 to 1930.  In 1829, New 
York became the first state to create an insurance program covering bank 
deposits.32  Between 1831 and 1858, five other states—Vermont, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Iowa—initiated programs as well.33  These programs 
achieved varying levels of success.  New York’s, Vermont’s, and 
Michigan’s systems all failed.34  The most successful of the six programs 
was Indiana’s, which relied on a system of unlimited mutual liability and 
self-regulation by banks.35  During its thirty year history, it saw not a single 
bank fail.36  Ultimately, all of these systems ceased to exist by 1865 once 
national bank charters became more popular.37 
Between 1907 and 1917, eight other states adopted deposit insurance 
schemes38:  Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Washington, and Texas.39  The systems were all very similar,40 
and a majority also granted supervisory authority to state governments to 
regulate member banks.41 
Supervision turned out to be the biggest problem.  The combination of 
understaffing, insufficient funding, and fraud made it impossible for the 
supervisory systems to be effective.42  This created an incentive for insured 
banks to take advantage of cross-subsidization by engaging in excessive 
 
 30. See id. at 310–11; see also George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and 
Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 24 (1996) (noting that FDIC deposit insurance has 
prevented bank runs). 
 31. See Nancy J. Coppola, Increased Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage:  At What 
Cost?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 429, 431 (2002). 
 32. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION:  THE 
FIRST FIFTY YEARS 13 (1984); Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A 
Historical Perspective, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 283, 286 (1990). 
 33. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 14. 
 34. See Calomiris, supra note 32, at 286–87.  New York’s failure was particularly acute 
due to poor funding from limits on annual premiums and ineffectual oversight. See id. 
 35. Id. at 287–88; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 14, 19. 
 36. Calomiris, supra note 32, at 287–88; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 
32, at 14, 19. 
 37. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 22. 
 38. Id. at 24; see also Clifford F. Thies & Daniel A. Gerlowski, Deposit Insurance:  A 
History of Failure, 8 CATO J. 677, 680 (1989). 
 39. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 25–27 tbl. 2.4; see also Thies & 
Gerlowski, supra note 38, at 680. 
 40. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 24–29. 
 41. Id. at 28; see also Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288. 
 42. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 28; Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288. 
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risk taking and maintaining low levels of capital.43  These practices, 
combined with falling agricultural prices and other economic issues of the 
1920s, caused many member banks to become insolvent44 and doomed 
these systems.45 
3.  I’ll Be There For You:  Crisis and the Creation of the FDIC 
By the end of 1930, it became clear that the banking crisis was not just 
reserved to the small rural banks that had failed in the 1920s and doomed 
the most recent state insurance systems.46  Banks all over the country 
suffered from liquidity issues, and bank runs became increasingly 
common.47  The situation culminated in the banking crisis of 1933.  As a 
result of several factors,48 in early 1933, sudden withdrawal demands 
created “a panic of massive proportions.”49  By March 4, 1933, “every state 
in the Union had declared a bank holiday.”50 
After the passage of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, the immediate 
crisis began to subside and the discussion of long-term reform, including 
deposit insurance, began.51  Between 1886 and 1933, a total of 150 
proposals for federally sponsored deposit insurance were made in Congress, 
all with very different elements.52 
Of the 150 bills, 118 provided for the establishment of an insurance fund 
out of which depositors’ losses would be paid, 22 provided for United 
States government guaranty of deposits, and 10 required banks to 
purchase surety bonds guaranteeing deposits in full. . . .  Eighty percent of 
the bills provided for insurance or guaranty of all deposits. . . .  In nearly 
one-half of the bills the entire cost of deposit insurance . . . was to be met 
by assessments based upon total deposits or average total deposits. The 
rates of assessment ranged. . . .  In a number of bills, assessments upon 
the banks were to be supplemented by appropriations from the United 
States government . . . [and many others also] called for a limit on the 
accumulation of funds by the insurance or guaranty system.53 
The bills also differed in their provisions for what organization of the U.S. 
government would administer the insurance system.54 
 
 43. See Calomiris, supra note 32, at 288–89. 
 44. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 28.  Between 1921 and 1929, an 
average of more than 600 banks per year failed.  These were predominantly small rural 
banks like those insured by the state funds. See id. at 33. 
 45. See id. at 28; see also Calomiris, supra note 32, at 289. 
 46. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 33. 
 47. See id. at 33–37. 
 48. See id. at 36–38. 
 49. See id. at 38. 
 50. Id.  A bank holiday occurs when the government suspends all banking transactions 
for a period of time, essentially closing all banks. See William L. Silber, Why Did FDR’s 
Bank Holiday Succeed?, 15 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 19 (2009). 
 51. See id. at 40. 
 52. See id. at 29. 
 53. See id. at 29–30. 
 54. See id. at 29. 
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Federally sponsored deposit insurance, however, did not lack 
opposition.55  Critics, such as Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, the banking 
industry, and even President Franklin Roosevelt,56 worried that the system 
would be ineffective, promote bad management, and be overly expensive.57  
However, the idea enjoyed widespread public support, and thus, when 
banking reform bills were proposed in each house of Congress in May 
1933, both contained provisions for federally sponsored deposit 
insurance.58  Both bills subsequently passed their respective houses and 
were sent to a joint conference committee.59  On June 16, 1933, President 
Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 into law, creating federally 
sponsored deposit insurance in the United States.60 
4.  I’ve Got Ninety-Nine Problems and Legislation To Fix Them All:  
Legal Adjustments to Deposit Insurance from 1933–2008 
Since the creation of the FDIC and federally sponsored deposit insurance 
in 1933, the system has undergone several changes due to various 
legislative enactments over the years.  The Banking Act of 193361 created 
the FDIC,62 a temporary deposit insurance plan to begin on January 1, 
1934,63 and a permanent plan to become effective six months later.64  
Under the temporary plan, depositor protection was limited to $2,500 for 
each depositor.65  The permanent plan provided full protection of the first 
$10,000 for each depositor, 75 percent coverage for the next $40,000 of 
deposits, and 50 percent coverage for all deposits in excess of $50,000.66  
However, that system never took effect because of the passage of the 
Banking Act of 1935.67 
The Banking Act of 193568 created a new permanent plan insuring 100 
percent of deposits up to $5,000 for each depositor at an insured 
 
 55. See id. at 40–41. 
 56. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 432 (quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who 
claimed that “‘insurance covering all banks would protect improvident operators from the 
consequences of their own folly’”). 
 57. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 40–41. 
 58. See id. at 41. 
 59. See id. at 42–43. 
 60. See id. at 43. 
 61. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
 62. See id. § 8, 48 Stat. at 168 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012)); FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43. 
 63. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 172–80 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1815); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43. 
 64. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 172–73 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 43. 
 65. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 179 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44. 
 66. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. at 173 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44. 
 67. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 44. 
 68. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
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institution.69  The 1935 Act also set the assessment rate at one-twelfth of 1 
percent of total deposits.70  Lastly, the 1935 Act gave the FDIC broader 
powers to facilitate mergers or consolidations of insured banks.71 
In 1950, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act72 created a rebate system.73  
This reflected concerns that the assessment rate was too high and the 
insurance fund sufficiently funded.74  The 1950 Act also increased the 
coverage of insured deposits to $10,000.75  Over the next several years, 
various legislative measures increased the limit to $15,000 in 1966, $20,000 
in 1969, and $40,000 in 1974.76  In addition, in 1978, the insurance limit for 
certain types of retirement accounts was also raised to $100,000.77  In 1980, 
the basic limit was raised to $100,000 for all types of deposit accounts78 
after the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA).79 DIDMCA also set a minimum designated 
reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.10 percent of estimated insured deposits and a 
maximum DRR of 1.40 percent.80 
The next significant changes to the FDIC and deposit insurance in the 
United States came in 1989 and 1991.  In 1989, the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act81 (FIRREA) gave the FDIC 
responsibility over insuring the deposits of savings and thrift institutions.82  
FIRREA also created two separate insurance funds:  the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).83  
Lastly, FIRREA set the DRR at 1.25 percent of estimated insured deposits, 
but allowed the FDIC to increase it to 1.50 percent if necessary.84 
 
 69. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 694 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821). 
 70. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 688 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817). 
 71. See id. § 101, 49 Stat. at 694–700 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821). 
 72. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873. 
 73. See id. § 2, 64 Stat. at 877–78 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817). 
 74. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 58. The rebate system functioned by 
subtracting the FDIC’s operating expenses and insurance losses from gross assessment 
income, and then splitting the remainder with 60 percent going back to insured institutions 
and 40 percent staying with the FDIC. See id. at 60. 
 75. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 § 3, 64 Stat. at 875 (current version at 12 
U.S.C. § 1821). 
 76. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 69. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, § 308m, 94 Stat. 132, 147 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); FED. DEPOSIT 
INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 69. 
 79. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 
132 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821). 
 80. Id. § 308, 94 Stat. at 148 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)). 
 81. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).  FIRREA was passed largely in response 
to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 433–34. 
 82. See Coppola, supra note 31, at 433–34. 
 83. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act § 211, 103 Stat. at 
219 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)). 
 84. See id. § 208, 103 Stat. at 207 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)). 
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199185 
(FDICIA) made two substantial changes to the operation of the FDIC.  
First, it required the FDIC to develop a system of risk-based deposit 
insurance premiums.86  Second, it imposed a least cost rule on the FDIC 
when resolving a failed or closed insured institution.87  Essentially, the least 
cost rule requires that the FDIC adopt the resolution method that is least 
costly to the deposit insurance fund.88  In addition, the FDICIA kept the 
DRR at 1.25 percent of estimated insured deposits, but allowed the FDIC to 
raise it to a higher number if justified by the circumstances.89 
After the FDICIA, deposit insurance in the United States experienced 
relatively little change for the rest of the twentieth century.  As Rebecca 
Duffy states in her article on deposit insurance, “The late 1990s did not lend 
itself as an era for vast discussion of deposit insurance reform because the 
economy was booming and banking conditions were favorable—meaning 
any discussion of deposit insurance reform was essentially tabled.”90  The 
lone exception was the Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996.91  That act 
prohibited the FDIC from charging premiums to well-capitalized 
institutions as long as the funds’ reserve ratio exceeded the DRR.92 
However, as the twenty-first century began, discussion of reform 
returned.93  The result was the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 
200594 (FIRA).  FIRA made a number of significant changes to the deposit 
insurance system in the United States.  First, FIRA merged the BIF and 
SAIF into one common fund, the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).95  Second, 
 
 85. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
 86. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 302, 105 Stat. at 
2245, 2349 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)); see also Viral V. Acharya, 
Joào A. C. Santos & Tanju Yorulmazer, Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, 18 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 89, 90 (2010) (“Throughout most of the FDIC’s 
history, deposit insurance premiums have been independent of bank risk, mainly because of 
the difficulty assessing that risk.  Between 1935 and 1990, the FDIC charged flat deposit 
insurance premiums at the rate of approximately 8.3 cents per $100 of insured deposits.”). 
 87. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 141, 105 Stat. at 
2273 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii)). 
 88. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives:  The FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 363 (1993). 
 89. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 302, 105 Stat. at 
2346 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)). 
 90. Rebecca N. Duffy, The Moral Hazard of Increased Deposit Insurance:  What the 
1980s Savings and Loan Crisis Can Teach Us About Responding to the Current Financial 
Crisis, 59 DRAKE. L. REV. 559, 563 (2011). 
 91. Federal Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 204-208, 110 Stat. 3009-
479 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(B)). 
 92. Id. § 2708, 110 Stat. at 3009-497 (repealed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2102(b), 120 Stat. 9 (2006)). 
 93. See Duffy, supra note 90, at 563. For a further discussion of the issues motivating 
reform during the early 2000s, see Coppola, supra note 31, at 436–48. 
 94. 120 Stat. 9 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 95. See id. § 2102, 120 Stat. at 9 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)); see 
also John L. Douglas et al., Deposit Insurance Reform Enacted, 123 BANKING L.J. 447, 448 
(2006). 
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the FDIC was given the power to adjust the DRR annually within the range 
of 1.15 and 1.50 percent.96  Third, if the DRR exceeded 1.35 percent, the 
FDIC was required to begin paying dividends to member institutions.97  
Fourth, the coverage on individual retirement accounts (IRAs) was raised to 
$250,000.98  Lastly, FIRA introduced a system to increase the $100,000 
coverage for basic deposits based on inflation.99  This provision was 
scheduled to begin in 2010, but was never utilized due to the 2008 financial 
crisis.100  However, it allows the FDIC and the Board of Directors of the 
National Credit Union Administration to raise the $100,000 cap every five 
years to account for inflation, with the multiplier coming from the 
Department of Commerce’s Personal Consumption Expenditure Chain-
Type Price Index.101 
The next significant changes to deposit insurance in the United States 
came during and after the 2008 financial crisis.  The Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 temporarily increased the standard minimum 
deposit insurance amount (SMDIA) from $100,000 to $250,000 per 
depositor.102  The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 
extended this temporary increase.103  However, these changes were only 
temporary measures aimed at creating immediate economic stability.  
Significant and permanent change to deposit insurance and the operation of 
the FDIC did not come until the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010. 
5.  When There’s Something Wrong with Your LCFI, Who You Gonna 
Call?:  Dodd-Frank, Deposit Insurance, and the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority 
In general, Dodd-Frank’s stated goal was to end TBTF and prevent 
bailouts—in other words, to deal with the problems of the implicit 
government safety net.104  However, it also included key changes to the 
operation of deposit insurance and the FDIC.  In regards to deposit 
insurance, Dodd-Frank permanently increased the SMDIA from $100,000 
to $250,000, and provided for unlimited coverage on non–interest bearing 
transactional accounts until December 31, 2012.105  Dodd-Frank also raised 
 
 96. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2105, 120 Stat. at 14 (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 448. 
 97. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2107, 120 Stat. at 16 (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (e)); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 448. 
 98. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2103, 120 Stat. at 11–12 (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 447. 
 99. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 § 2103, 120 Stat. at 10 (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(F)). 
 100. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 101. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(F); see also Douglas et al., supra note 95, at 449. 
 102. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3799 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 5241 (2012)). 
 103. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204, 123 
Stat. 1632, 1648–52 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5241). 
 104. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 105. Id. § 343, 124 Stat. at 1540 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821). 
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the minimum DRR to 1.35 percent, removed any upper limit on the fund,106 
and eliminated the requirement that the FDIC provide refunds when the 
DRR is between 1.35 and 1.50 percent.107 
Additionally, Dodd-Frank instructed the FDIC to promulgate regulations 
redefining the assessment base as the average total consolidated assets of an 
insured depository institution minus tangible equity.108  In 2011, pursuant to 
this mandate, the FDIC finalized the implementing regulation.109  At the 
same time, the FDIC also finalized new regulations altering the calculation 
of assessments for large insured institutions and highly complex insured 
institutions.110  Under these regulations, institutions will no longer have 
their base assessment rates calculated using the four risk categories.111  
Instead, they will be calculated using a scorecard that combines the 
CAMELS112 rating system with other financial measures.113 
Most importantly, Dodd-Frank gave the FDIC a vastly important new 
power:  the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).114  Under the OLA, if 
the Secretary of the Treasury, after recommendations by the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors (FRB) and the FDIC, believes that the 
impending failure of a LCFI would impact the financial stability of the 
United States, the Secretary can appoint the FDIC as receiver of the 
institution.115  If the institution’s board does not consent to the receivership, 
the Secretary can petition the D.C. District Court to impose an involuntary 
one.116  The scope of judicial review is limited to whether the Secretary’s 
determination that the institution is in danger of default is arbitrary and 
capricious.117 
Unlike when it is appointed as a receiver for a bank, the FDIC’s 
receivership powers under the OLA are specifically circumscribed.118  
Under the OLA, the FDIC is required to impose losses on unsecured 
 
 106. Id. § 334(a), 124 Stat. at 1539 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B)). 
 107. Id. § 332(d), 124 Stat. at 1539 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(e)). 
 108. Id. § 331(b), 124 Stat. at 1538 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817). 
 109. 12 C.F.R. § 327 (2013). 
 110. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327). 
 111. For more on the traditional four risk categories, see infra notes 146–50 and 
accompanying text. 
 112. The CAMELS rating system is an overall rating of a bank’s condition created by 
examining six specific components:  capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity market risk. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 317–18, 633–36. 
 113. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,688. 
 114. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 202–217, 124 
Stat. at 1444–520 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394). 
 115. Id. § 203, 124 Stat. at 1450 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383); see also Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:  Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and 
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 190–91 
(2011). 
 116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 202(a)(1), 124 Stat. 
at 1444–45 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5382). 
 117. Id. 
 118. For banks, the FDIC’s liquidation authority is only limited by the requirement that it 
pursue the least-cost resolution strategy. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
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creditors and shareholders, remove management and board members 
responsible for the institution’s problems,119 and treat amounts owed to 
highly compensated employees as unsecured claims.120  Additionally, the 
FDIC cannot create a conservatorship or offer open bank assistance, but can 
only liquidate the institution.121  However, the FDIC has broad authority to 
provide financing to facilitate an institution’s liquidation.122  Funding for 
the liquidation comes from the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), which is 
in turn funded by borrowing from the Treasury Department.123  The fund is 
ultimately repaid through the sale of assets, authorized recoveries, and, if 
necessary, an ex post risk-based assessment on large bank holding 
companies (BHCs) and systemically important financial institutions124 
(SIFIs).125 
The goal of the OLA is to eliminate the necessity that regulators pick 
between two equally unsavory choices when dealing with a troubled 
financial institution.126  During the 2008 financial crisis, financial 
regulators only had two options:  allow a financial institution to fail and 
hurt the economy or create a politically unpopular bailout.127  Dodd-Frank 
made the OLA and FDIC receivership the only route for a troubled firm.128  
The result is an orderly liquidation that prevents economic shockwaves, and 
a resolution that does not use taxpayer money to save an institution from its 
own mistakes.129 
 
 119. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 206, 124 Stat. at 
1459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386). 
 120. Id. § 210(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1475–76 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); see 
also Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 190–94. 
 121. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 214(a), 124 Stat. at 
1518 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5394); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, 
at 190–94. 
 122. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 204(d), 124 Stat. at 
1455–56 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5384); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note 
115, at 190–94. 
 123. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(n), 124 Stat. at 
1506–09 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); see also Gordon & Muller, supra note 
115, at 190–94. 
 124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 210(n)–(o), 214, 
124 Stat. at 1506–14, 1518 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5390, 5394); see also 
Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 192. 
 125. The term SIFI in this Note refers to all institutions that are nonbank financial 
institutions regulated by the FRB under Dodd-Frank.  Section 113 of Dodd-Frank gives the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the power to subject nonbank financial 
institutions to regulation by the FRB if the FSOC “determines that material financial distress 
at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could 
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 
Accordingly, the term SIFI is intended to cover those institutions subjected to additional 
regulation under Dodd-Frank, due to their status as nonbank financial institutions that the 
FSOC has designated for FRB regulation, by virtue of their importance to the economy. 
 126. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 993. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 152–53. 
 129. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 993. 
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However, the OLA has been criticized on a number of grounds, most 
prominently the lack of pre-funding for the OLF.130  In his article, The 
Dodd-Frank Act:  A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-
Fail Problem, Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. articulates four reasons why failure 
to pre-fund the OLF creates significant problems.  First, in a time of 
financial crisis precipitating the need for the OLA, it is unlikely large BHCs 
and SIFIs will have the necessary funds to replenish the OLF with ex ante 
assessments.131  The result will be the use of a large amount of taxpayer 
funds to pay for the liquidations.132  Second, the system unfairly forces the 
most prudent surviving institutions to pay for the costs of the excessive 
risks of the failed institutions.133  Third, a prefunded OLF would encourage 
institutions to monitor each other’s conduct in order to avoid depleting the 
fund and triggering special assessments.134  Fourth, paying a risk-based 
assessment to a prefunded OLF would force SIFIs to internalize the cost 
that their potential failure places on the government and taxpayers.135  
Furthermore, if the assessments were accurately calibrated to risk, they 
would reduce moral hazard and shield the government and taxpayers from 
potential exposure.136 
It is also not entirely clear that the receivership system created in the 
OLA is actually preferable.  Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller discuss 
this in their article Confronting Financial Crisis:  Dodd-Frank’s Dangers 
and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Relief Fund. 
In a systemic emergency, stabilization of the overall financial sector may 
be necessary.  The mechanism available under Dodd-Frank, receiverships 
imposed on multiple major financial firms on a narrow timeframe, will be 
difficult to administer and will amount to government nationalization of a 
large portion of the financial sector with unpredictable consequences.  
Such a massive intervention is hardly the best way to avoid the breakout 
of financial sector distress into the real economy.  Moreover, the threat of 
this strategy could accelerate the slide from financial sector instability to 
financial sector crisis.  An alternative approach would require recourse to 
Congress for additional authority in the middle of a crisis.  This strategy is 
also likely to result in the breakout of the financial crisis into the real 
economy.  Even worse, a legislative failure in the crucible of an 
emergency would be a major blow to public confidence and a genuine 
catastrophe for the real economy.137 
Therefore, in a financial crisis, assisting struggling institutions or bailing 
them out may be more effective in preventing a crisis than OLA 
 
 130. Earlier versions of the legislation did provide for a prefunded OLF, but Republican 
resistance to the idea resulted in it being removed from the final legislation. Id. at 1015–17. 
 131. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1015–20. 
 132. Id. at 1015–20. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1020–22. 
 137. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 204. 
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receivership.138  Gordon and Muller thus propose that direct assistance 
should be provided to firms in a time of crisis through a prefunded systemic 
emergency relief fund.139 
B.  I’ll Be Watching You:  The Current Operation of Federally Sponsored 
Deposit Insurance in the United States 
What is clear from the discussion in Part I.A is that, in the approximate 
eighty years since its inception, federally sponsored deposit insurance in the 
United States has undergone a number of complex changes.  Therefore, this 
section offers a concise description of the current state of the law, and the 
processes by which the FDIC operates.  The FDIC is an independent agency 
of the federal government, and FDIC insurance covers all deposit accounts 
including checking, savings, and money market deposit accounts.140  The 
current level of insurance is $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for 
each account ownership category.141  In the event of a bank failure, a 
depositor at an FDIC-insured bank is typically able to recover their funds 
quickly with little delay.142  The FDIC does not cover many of the other 
financial products that banks offer like stocks, bonds, life insurance 
policies, and securities.143 
FDIC deposit insurance coverage is provided by the DIF.144  The DIF is 
funded by premiums paid by insured depository institutions, typically 
banks.145  These premiums are calculated by multiplying an institution’s 
assessment rate by its assessment base.146  For many institutions, the 
assessment rate is determined by a number of factors.  The most important 
factor is which of four possible risk categories the insured institution falls 
into.147  Category I is the lowest risk and Category IV is the highest.  The 
FDIC’s designation of an institution into a risk category is primarily based 
on capital148 levels and the FDIC’s evaluations of the institution.149  Once a 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 115, at 204–05. 
 140. Deposit Insurance Summary, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
deposits/dis/index.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2013). 
 141. See id.; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 70–72 (discussing the 
complex rules regarding ownership categories). 
 142. See George G. Kaufman & Steven A. Seelig, Post-resolution Treatment of 
Depositors at Failed Banks:  Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, 
and Too-Big-To-Fail 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 83, 2001). But see FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 83–85 (noting delays may occur in paying deposits). 
 143. Deposit Insurance Summary, supra note 140. 
 144. The Deposit Insurance Fund, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/
insurance/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2013). 
 145. See Deposit Insurance Summary, supra note 140. 
 146. Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,673 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327). 
 147. See id. at 10,672–73. 
 148. For banks, capital is the firm’s net worth or equity.  A firm’s equity is essentially all 
that would be left if it paid off all of its creditors.  Accordingly, it equals the firm’s total 
assets minus the firm’s total liabilities.  Capital is important because the more capital a bank 
has, or the more that its assets exceed its liabilities, the more likely it is to be able to pay 
back its creditors.  Total capital, or total equity, is Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 
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risk category is determined, the final assessment rate is calculated after 
factoring in a number of other adjustments.150  The assessment base is 
determined by subtracting the institution’s average tangible equity from the 
institution’s average consolidated total assets.151 
The system operates differently for large insured institutions152 and 
highly complex institutions.153  For these institutions, base assessment rates 
are not calculated using risk categories, but instead using a scorecard that 
combines the CAMELS rating system with other financial measures.154  
Once the base assessment rate is calculated, the FDIC reserves the right to 
adjust it based on significant factors not captured in the scorecards.155  The 
scorecards are different for large insured institutions and highly complex 
institutions.156 
By law, the minimum designated reserve ratio of the DIF cannot fall 
below 1.35 percent of estimated insured deposits.157  If it does, the FDIC is 
required to adopt a restoration plan to restore its funds.158  There is no cap 
on how high the DRR may be, and the FDIC may determine the appropriate 
level every year.159  However, if the DRR exceeds 1.50 percent of 
estimated insured deposits, the FDIC is permitted to, but not required to, 
issue dividends to insured institutions.160 
In the event that an insured depository institution fails or is closed by its 
primary regulator,161 the FDIC may take a number of actions.  First, in 
almost every case, the process begins with the FDIC being appointed as 
receiver of a failed bank.162  Second, the FDIC must decide between the use 
 
capital is more permanent, reliable, and resilient, and consists of specific types of equity.  
Tier 2 capital is everything else that qualifies as capital, and it is less preferable. See 
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 252–65. 
 149. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,672. 
 150. See id. at 10,672–73. 
 151. See id. at 10,678. 
 152. These are banks with $10 billion or more in total assets in December 2006, or for 
four consecutive quarters since then. See id. at 10,674 n.15. 
 153. These are banks with $50 billion or more in total assets that have a relationship with 
another U.S. company with assets of $500 billion or more. See id. at 10,688 n.52. 
 154. See id. at 10,688. 
 155. See id. at 10,699. 
 156. See id. at 10,689, 10,695. 
 157. See id. at 10,673; see also The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144. 
 158. The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144. 
 159. See Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,673. 
 160. See id. at 10,673–74; see also The Deposit Insurance Fund, supra note 144. 
 161. For example, a bank’s primary federal regulator may close a bank and place it in 
conservatorship or receivership because it is severely undercapitalized and has not complied 
with the requirements set forth in the FDICIA. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 327–28 
(discussing in depth the function and difficulty of defining the least-cost rule). 
 162. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 83 (“When a national bank is closed, the 
FDIC is automatically appointed receiver by the Comptroller of the Currency.  When an 
insured state bank is closed, a receiver is appointed according to state law . . . .  [I]t is the 
exception when the FDIC is not appointed.”); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 694 
(“The FDIC pays insured claims from the insurance fund and recoups what it can by selling 
the failed bank’s assets. The more efficient the resolution process, the smaller the FDIC’s 
loss. By acting as the failed bank’s receiver, the FDIC controls the process and has an 
opportunity to minimize its own loss.”). 
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of two processes, broadly described as the payout method and the purchase 
and assumption method (P&A method).163  By law, the FDIC is required to 
use whatever process would be the least costly in that instance.164  In the 
payout method, the FDIC pays off insured deposits directly, and “becomes 
a creditor of the receivership for the amount it advances.”165  The FDIC 
receivership then liquidates the bank’s assets, attempting to get the highest 
price possible to refund itself and the other creditors.166  In the P&A 
method, the FDIC engineers a sale of the deposits and loans of the failed 
institution to another institution.167  “Customers of the failed institution 
automatically become customers of the assuming institution . . . [and] the 
transition is seamless from the customer’s point of view.”168 
Lastly, there are two ways the FDIC may take action before an insured 
institution is closed or fails.  First, the FDIC has the power to provide 
assistance to banks through loans or purchase of assets.169  Second, the 
FDIC has the power to facilitate a merger or acquisition of a failing bank by 
making loans, purchasing assets, and providing guarantees.170 
C.  It’s the End of the World As We Know It:  The Rise of 
the Modern TBTF LCFIs 
Today, many of the commercial banks insured by the FDIC are part of 
LCFIs and are legally organized under the umbrella of Financial Holding 
Companies (FHCs).171  These affiliations were initially prohibited under the 
Banking Act of 1933, colloquially referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act 
(GSA), which forced the separation of commercial banking from 
investment banking (i.e., securities firms).172  Specifically, section 20 of the 
GSA prohibited member banks from affiliating with a business “engaged 
principally” in investment banking.173  The separation between commercial 
and investment banks was later strengthened in 1956 by the Bank Holding 
Company Act (BHCA) requirement that BHCs, or companies owning or 
controlling banks, could not own or control any company that was not a 
 
 163. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 81–88. 
 164. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 694; see also Carnell, supra note 88, at 363–
67. 
 165. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 85. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 87–94; see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 731 (noting the difficult 
statutory requirements the FDIC must overcome to provide open bank assistance). 
 168. Who Is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/
symbol/index.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2013). 
 169. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 32, at 94–97. 
 170. Id. at 81. 
 171. Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 220. 
 172. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 6. 
 173. See Banking Act of 1933 § 20, 48 Stat. at 188–89, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999); see also CARPENTER & 
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 6. 
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bank or engaged in an activity not related to banking.174  These prohibitions 
remained unchallenged for several decades as many strongly believed that 
the connection between commercial banking and securities firms had led to 
the Great Depression.175 
This view began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s.176  High 
interest rates drove consumers to put their funds in interest bearing 
accounts,177 businesses began to rely on securitization for short term 
funding,178 and new competitors entered the market.179  Banks suddenly 
found their market share180 and profits181 steadily dropping, and they put 
pressure on their regulators to ease the restrictions imposed by the GSA. 
While the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) responded by 
allowing commercial banks to engage in a wider variety of financial 
activities,182 the FRB responded by allowing ever more complex corporate 
combinations between banks and other financial entities.  Supported by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System v. Investment Co. Institute,183 the FRB declared that bank 
subsidiaries could engage in activities involving certain bank ineligible 
securities without violating section 20, as long as these activities did not 
exceed a certain percentage of gross revenue.184  Over time, the 
requirements became increasingly liberal,185 and by 1996 the FRB had 
essentially allowed any large bank to affiliate with any large securities 
 
 174. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4, 70 Stat. 133, 
135–37 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012)). 
 175. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. 
Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33?  A Preliminary Assessment, 4 CURRENT 
DEVS. MONETARY & FIN. L. 559, 590–91 (2005). 
 176. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8. 
 177. Depositors shifted huge amounts of funds into money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs) that offer considerably higher yields to investors and many of the advantages of 
bank accounts such as demand withdrawal and check writing. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, 
at 239–40 & n.95. 
 178. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8. 
 179. See WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, BANKING, POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCE 57 (1995). 
 180. Id. at 57, 95. 
 181. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, at 8. 
 182. See id. at 10; see also Eligibility of Securities for Purchase, Dealing in Underwriting 
and Holding by National Banks; Rulings Issued by the Comptroller, 47 Fed. Reg. 18,323 
(Apr. 29, 1982) (current version at 12 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 1 (2013)). 
 183. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).  The Court held that the FRB’s determination of what 
constituted the business of banking under the BHCA was entitled to great deference. Id. at 
56–58.  It also found that the FRB’s decision to allow bank subsidiaries to engage in certain 
investment activities did not violate the GSA, which only applied to banks and not 
subsidiaries. Id. at 63–65; see also MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS 4-55 
to -56 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that the holding effectively meant that bank affiliates or 
subsidiaries could legally engage in activities prohibited for banks themselves). 
 184. Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 73 FED. RES. 
BULL. 473, 475–77 (1987). 
 185. Regulation Y Amendment, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 751 (1989) (doubling the revenue 
requirement to 10 percent); see also REINICKE, supra note 179, at 114. 
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firm.186  In 1998, the FRB approved the merger between Citibank and 
Travelers, making Citibank the largest banking organization in the world 
and allowing it to offer a full range of financial services.187  Finally, in 
1999, Congress overwhelmingly passed,188 and President Clinton signed 
into law, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).189  The GLBA effectively 
removed the barriers separating commercial banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies, principally by repealing section 20 of the GSA and 
relevant provisions of the BHCA.190  The era of the large complex financial 
institution was born.191 
D.  Can’t Touch This:  Sections 23A and 23B and the  
Rules of Separation Between Banks and FHC Affiliates 
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act restrict the interactions 
between commercial banks and their affiliates and subsidiaries.192  Section 
23A193 was enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933194 in order to 
protect federally insured depository institutions from excessive exposure to 
their riskier affiliates, and to prevent transfer of the federal subsidy to non-
depository institutions.195  Section 23B196 was enacted in 1987 as part of 
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987197 to provide further 
protection in anticipation of the expanded securities powers being granted 
to banks and BHCs.198   
Both 23A and 23B define an affiliate as any company that controls the 
bank and any company that is controlled by such company.199  Financial 
 
 186. Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n, to William W. Wiles, 
Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 30, 1996), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=461. 
 187. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Announcing Conditional Approval of the  
Merger Between Travelers and Citigroup (Sept. 23, 1998), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bhc/1998/19980923/19980923.pdf. 
 188. See Daniel Parks, Financial Services Overhaul Bill Clears After Final Skirmishing 
over Community Reinvestment, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2654 (1999). 
 189. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 190. Id. § 101(a), 113 Stat. at 1341; FEIN, supra note 183, at 1-42. 
 191. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 1-43.  Fein notes that much of the consolidation took 
place before the passage of the GLBA. See id.  The GLBA is still notable, however, for 
removing any doubts as to the legality of LCFIs and providing an actual legal framework for 
them. See id. 
 192. The FRB has also issued Regulation W to help implement sections 23A and 23B.  
Regulation W also provides an array of specifics as to how these sections should operate. See 
12 C.F.R. § 223 (2013). 
 193. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2012). 
 194. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 13, 48 Stat. 162, 183 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 371c). 
 195. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank:  The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2011). 
 196. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1. 
 197. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 102, 101 Stat. 
552, 564–66 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1). 
 198. See FEIN, supra note 183, at 2-36. 
 199. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b). 
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subsidiaries of the banks themselves also are considered affiliates.200  
Sections 23A and 23B similarly define covered transactions201 to include 
extending credit to an affiliate, purchasing or investing in the securities or 
derivatives of an affiliate, accepting the affiliate’s securities as collateral for 
any extension of credit, and guaranteeing obligations of the affiliate.202 
Under section 23A, all covered transactions must be on terms and 
conditions “consistent with safe and sound banking practices.”203  Section 
23A also places an overall limit of 20 percent on the total amount of credit a 
bank may extend to its affiliates204 and a 10 percent limit on credit extended 
to any specific affiliate.205  Extensions of credit are required to be secured 
by collateral according to a specific formula.206  Furthermore, section 23A 
also prohibits banks from purchasing certain low-quality assets from an 
affiliate.207 
Section 23B provides a general requirement that all transactions with 
affiliates, including covered transactions, be at arms length.208  This means 
that the transaction must be on the same terms as the bank would require for 
a nonaffiliated company, at a similar time, in a similar transaction.209  If 
there is no comparable transaction, it must be on terms that in good faith 
would be offered to a nonaffiliated company.210  Section 23B also imposes 
the arms length requirement on securities sales by a bank to an affiliate, 
payment of money or services to or from an affiliate, and any transactions 
between the bank and a third party in which the affiliate has a financial 
interest.211  Lastly, under section 23B, a bank is barred from publishing any 
advertisement or entering into an agreement suggesting that it is responsible 
for the obligations of affiliates.212 
The OCC, FRB, and FDIC all have statutory power to grant exemptions 
from section 23A to their respective institutions for a transaction.213  The 
requirement for an exemption is that it be in the public interest and related 
to the purpose of section 23A.214  The OCC and FRB are required to notify 
the FDIC before an exemption, and give it sixty days to object in writing if 
it finds the action presents a risk to the DIF.215 
 
 200. Id. § 371c-1(d). 
 201. See id. §§ 371c(b)(7), 371c-1(b). 
 202. See id.; 12 C.F.R § 223.3(h) (2013); see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 14, 
at 23. 
 203. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4). 
 204. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(B). 
 205. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A). 
 206. Id. § 371c(c). 
 207. Id. § 371c(a)(3). 
 208. Id. § 371c-1. 
 209. Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A). 
 210. Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B). 
 211. Id. § 371c-1(a)(2). 
 212. Id. § 371c-1(c). 
 213. Id. § 371c(f). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. § 371c(f)(2). 
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II.  GOVERNMENT-INSURED GAMBLING:  THE PROBLEMS 
WITH DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
As detailed in Part I, the U.S. scheme of federally sponsored deposit 
insurance was created with the goal of protecting depositors and creating 
stability in the banking system.216  While a federally sponsored deposit 
insurance structure may help to achieve those goals, some of the negative 
consequences of such a system may also work to undermine them.  This 
Part describes the problems created by having a federally sponsored system 
of deposit insurance.  Part II.A discusses these problems generally, Part II.B 
offers specific examples from the recent past, and Part II.C examines 
whether the post–2008 financial crisis legislation has substantively 
improved any of these issues. 
A.  I Knew You Were Trouble When You Walked in:  How Deposit 
Insurance Creates Moral Hazard and Economic Instability 
The principal issue created by any insurance system is moral hazard.217  
Moral hazard can best be described as “[t]he tendency of an insured to relax 
his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured against 
because he has shifted the risk to an insurance company.”218  In the deposit 
insurance context, this means that depositors who are insured against loss 
are no longer concerned that a bank acting imprudently may lose its 
funds.219  Accordingly, depositors are no longer incentivized to monitor 
their banks’ activities.220 
This removes what would be two powerful restraints on a bank’s 
activities:  bank runs and higher interest rates.  Absent deposit insurance, if 
depositors believed a bank was taking excessively risky actions with their 
funds, they would either withdraw their funds (potentially initiating a bank 
run)221 or demand higher interest rates.222  But once deposit insurance 
makes depositor concerns irrelevant, banks no longer have to worry about 
bank runs223 and can raise funds from depositors at a substantially lower 
cost.224  This leaves banks free to assume more risk.225 
 
 216. See supra Part I. 
 217. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 327 (describing all the issues insurance 
creates for private insurers because of moral hazard). 
 218. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1998). 
 219. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 319–21. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Kaufman, supra note 30, at 23–24. 
 222. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293. 
 223. See Kaufman, supra note 30, at 23–24. 
 224. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Dark Side of Universal Banking:  Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime 
Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 977–79 (2009). 
 225. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293–94; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 211 (2008). 
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The cost of that risk, which the bank would have borne itself through 
having to pay higher interest rates to depositors,226 is then shifted to DIF 
and the federal government that unequivocally backs it.227  In addition, 
deposit insurance, along with the other elements of the explicit federal 
safety net, allows banks to borrow funds at substantially lower interest 
rates.228  Thus, deposit insurance in the United States ultimately creates a 
federal subsidy that allows banks to access artificially cheap funds,229 
which, again, can make it easier for banks to engage in higher levels of risk 
taking.230 
The government attempts to restrain banks and LCFIs from taking 
advantage of this federal subsidy and from engaging in excessively risky 
activity through a variety of measures231:  (1) a system of regulatory 
oversight232 and capital requirements to restrain banks’ risk taking,233 (2) a 
system of risk-based premiums to attempt to shift the cost of risk from the 
DIF back to banks,234 and (3) sections 23A and 23B to prevent the spread 
of the subsidy to other nonbank financial institutions.235  However, history 
has demonstrated that these measures are often inadequate and 
ineffective,236 and continue to allow deposit insurance to provide an 
incentive for banks to engage in excessive risk taking.  This risk taking, it 
has been argued, can in turn result in increased banking instability, 
increased likelihood of a banking crisis, and the increased likelihood of 
larger economic crisis.237 
B.  Memories of the Way We Were:  Examples of Deposit 
Insurance’s Negative Repercussions 
Part II.B.1, II.B.2, and II.B.3 will give specific examples of the negative 
repercussions that deposit insurance has had on the financial system. 
 
 226. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 293; see also Wilmarth, supra note 224, at 
977–79. 
 227. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309. 
 228. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking:  An Overdue Reform That Could 
Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Financial Regulation of 
Financial Conglomerates (Part II), BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Apr. 2012, at 1, 5. 
 229. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 309. 
 230. See Schwarcz, supra note 225, at 211. 
 231. See Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows:  Systemic Moral Hazard and the 
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 233 (2012). 
 232. See Kam Hon Chu, Deposit Insurance and Banking Stability, 31 CATO J. 99, 105 
(2011) (noting that deposit insurance, by removing depositors as monitors, creates the need 
for regulatory oversight). 
 233. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 233. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1687; Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 456. 
 236. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 233. 
 237. See Kam Hon Chu, Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises in the Short and Long 
Run, 23 CATO J. 265, 277 (2003) (concluding that deposit insurance does not make the 
occurrence of bank crises less likely in the long run, and may actually increase that 
likeliness). 
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1.  Our House, with Two Cats in the Yard, and a Mortgage We Cannot Pay:  
Nonprime Lending and Deposit Insurance 
As an example of the ability of deposit insurance to encourage excessive 
risk taking and contribute to financial crisis, some commentators have 
pointed to its role in nonprime lending in the early 2000s.  Nonprime home 
mortgages are inherently risky because they are offered to people with bad 
credit, who pose a greater risk of default and do not qualify for prime 
mortgages.238  Additionally, the risk of these mortgages increased over the 
course of the early 2000s as lending standards deteriorated.239  Despite this 
risk, the volume of nonprime mortgages grew from $250 billion to 
$1 trillion between 2001 and 2006.240  Nearly 10 million nonprime 
mortgages were originated between 2003 and mid-2007.241  Furthermore, 
depository institutions and their subsidiaries and affiliates originated 79 
percent of those.242 
Banks kept originating these high-risk loans because they were making 
substantial profits from the loan fees and subsequent securitization.243  
These profits were attainable because deposit insurance allowed banks to 
raise money cheaply to fund these loans regardless of their risk.244  
Recognizing the advantages of this system, even securities firms that were 
not initially banks sought to acquire insured depository institutions.245  For 
example, in 2003, Merrill Lynch relied on FDIC-insured bank deposits to 
provide 51 percent of its funding for commercial and consumer loans.246 
This boom in nonprime lending was ultimately catastrophic for the 
financial industry and the overall economy.  Many analysts blame the 2008 
financial crisis on the collapse of the housing market and the subsequent 
loss in value of the myriad financial products that based their value on that 
market.247  Much of the expansion in the housing market in the run-up to 
the crisis was driven by the growth in nonprime home mortgages.248  By 
2009, commercial and investment banks had suffered more than $910 
billion in losses related to these loans and many required bailouts.249 
 
 238. See Wilmarth, supra note 224, at 1015–16. 
 239. See id. at 1020. 
 240. See id. at 970. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. at 1018–19. 
 243. See id. at 970–72. 
 244. See id. at 977–80. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. at 977 n.46. 
 247. See id. at 970. 
 248. See id. at 1015–16. 
 249. See id. at 1044. 
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2.  Tell Me Have You Ever Really, Really Ever Loved a Derivative?:  
How Deposit Insurance Encouraged Speculative 
Derivatives Trading at Banks 
Deposit insurance also played a role in helping banks grow their 
derivatives business in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, providing 
another example of the ability of deposit insurance to contribute to financial 
crises.  The OCC permits national banks to originate, deal, and trade in a 
wide variety of derivatives as part of the business of banking.250  Normally, 
a derivative is “simply a contract between two parties whose value is based 
on changes in an interest rate, currency, or almost anything else.”251  The 
primary use of derivatives is to protect or hedge against loss from market 
risk.252 
In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, banks were also permitted to 
use derivatives to incur risk when speculating on their own account.253  In 
addition, many of these were over-the-counter (OTC) and financial 
derivatives that could be tailored to mimic the risk and return profiles of 
fundamental securities like stocks and bonds, and thus were subject to the 
same types of risks as traditional securities.254  These derivatives were also 
subject to additional risks.255  They were more complex and harder to value 
than traditional securities,256 and subject to possible mass default if the 
price in the underlying asset suddenly changed.257  Additionally, many of 
these derivatives were highly leveraged, allowing them to create potential 
losses that far exceeded the holder’s investment.258 
Despite these risks, in the run-up to the financial crisis, banks used OTC 
derivatives extensively to earn fees and generate profits through proprietary 
trading.259  “At the end of 2000, the seven most active bank dealers in the 
United States held derivatives with total notional values of more than $38 
trillion, seven times the volume they held in 1990,” and “OTC derivatives 
accounted for more than four-fifths of the derivative portfolios.”260  Big 
banks also dominated the derivatives trade, with seven of them holding 
approximately 96 percent of all derivatives held by U.S. banks in 2000.261 
 
 250. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL BANK, 
CUMULATIVE 57 (2012), available at http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/other-publications-reports/bankact.pdf. 
 251. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:  UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 60 (2011). 
 252. See JAMES HAMILTON ET AL., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES 
110–11 (1998). 
 253. See FEIN, supra note 183, at SR-26; HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 252, at 111. 
 254. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 337–38. 
 255. Id. at 338. 
 256. Id. at 350. 
 257. Id. at 368. 
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 259. See id. at 337. 
 260. See id. at 334–35. 
 261. Id. at 334. 
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Banks were largely able to grow and dominate this business because of 
the significant advantages they enjoyed from the implicit federal safety net 
and from deposit insurance.262  First, whenever a bank failed in the past, 
regulators had always ensured its outstanding derivatives contracts were 
honored.263 In a complicated market like the one that exists for OTC 
derivatives,264 the expectation among investors that the default risk is less 
with banks is a substantial advantage.265  Second, as in the case of 
nonprime lending, deposit insurance provided banks access to low-cost 
funds they could utilize to engage in derivative trading, independent of the 
risks of those activities.266  This, in turn, allowed for higher profits from 
those activities.267  Thus, deposit insurance, in conjunction with the implicit 
safety net of bailouts, allowed banks to dominate and profit in the high-risk 
derivatives trade.268 
In search of the increasing profits that derivatives could provide, banks in 
the years preceding the financial crisis increasingly pursued derivatives 
activities based on nonprime mortgages.269  As a result, banks became 
exposed to multiple layers of risk dependent on the performance of an 
already high-risk asset.270  Thus, when the housing bubble ultimately burst, 
the derivative activities of banks contributed to their incurrence of even 
greater losses.271 
3.  All in All, It’s Just Another Leak in the Wall:  The Use of the Deposit 
Insurance Subsidy To Fund FHC Affiliates 
Another example of the problems created by deposit insurance is the 
inability of the government to contain the federal subsidy to banks within 
FHCs.  As discussed in Part I.E, the purposes of section 23A are to protect 
federally insured depository institutions from excessive exposure to their 
riskier affiliates, and to prevent the transfer of the federal subsidy to 
nondepository institutions.272  The government also has wide discretion to 
waive section 23A’s requirements for specific transactions.273  In her article 
From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank:  The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, Professor Saule T. Omarova argues 
that the ineffective use of this authority has severely undermined section 
 
 262. Id. at 336–37, 372–73. 
 263. See id. at 373. 
 264. See id. at 336 (describing how the market for OTC derivatives is a difficult one for 
investors because they do not utilize standardized terms, are not traded on an organized 
market, and are not protected from default risks by clearinghouse guarantees). 
 265. See id. at 373. 
 266. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 1044–45. 
 267. See Wilmarth, supra note 18, at 337. 
 268. See id. at 373. 
 269. See Wilmarth, supra note 224, at 991–95, 1028–34. 
 270. See id. at 1034. 
 271. See id. at 1043–44. 
 272. See Omarova, supra note 195, at 1686. 
 273. See id. at 1699–1702. 
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23A’s implementation, and allowed the federal subsidy to effectively 
subsidize the activities not just of banks but of LCFIs themselves.274 
Professor Omarova offers a number of examples.  She describes how, in 
the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, the FRB granted a number 
of waivers for LCFIs to reorganize their assets on the grounds that this 
would increase their efficiency and profitability.275  While the FRB 
continued to require that FDIC-insured banks not be saddled with low-
quality assets (and when they were, required appropriate compensation to 
be given),276 Professor Omarova suggests the FRB did not understand the 
true purpose of the LCFIs’ actions.277 
Citing Citibank as an example, she describes how LCFIs used these 
waivers to place large amounts of nonprime mortgages that originated in 
uninsured affiliates within their FDIC-insured affiliates.278  By doing this, 
LCFIs could capitalize on the advantages that their FDIC-insured affiliates 
enjoyed in creating and selling derivatives based on these mortgages.279  
Thus, these waivers essentially allowed LCFIs to saddle their FDIC-insured 
banks, and consequently the DIF, with increased risk so they could generate 
greater profits by utilizing the federal subsidy provided to their banks.280 
In another example, Professor Omarova details how, in late 2007, when 
the securities market was hit by the shock of the subprime fallout, the FRB 
allowed several FDIC-insured banks to extend credit to their affiliated 
securities broker dealers.281  “This was an extraordinary set of 
decisions,”282 Professor Omarova writes.  “Never before had the [FRB] 
removed the quantitative and qualitative requirements of section 23A, on 
such a massive scale, in order to prop up broader markets in distress.”283  
The FRB’s actions allowed LCFIs to use the cheap federally subsidized 
funds of their bank subsidiaries to bail out their securities affiliates, who 
were suffering for their high-risk activities.  This was exactly what section 
23A had been designed to prevent.284 
C.  Don’t Go Changing To Try and Please Me:  How Dodd-Frank Did 
Little To Improve the Issues Associated with Deposit Insurance 
After the financial crisis, the federal government initiated sweeping 
reforms of the banking and financial services industries through the passage 
of Dodd-Frank.  Among other things, Dodd-Frank altered the calculation of 
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FDIC premiums, increased banks’ capital requirements,285 and prevented 
LCFIs from engaging in certain types of high-risk activities if they operated 
an FDIC-insured bank.286  However, it is unclear whether these changes 
will actually rectify the problems discussed in Part II.A and II.B.  Dodd-
Frank’s goal was to eliminate the implicit safety net of federal bailouts 
created by the existence of TBTF LCFIs,287 and thus many of its changes 
reflect that objective and do not seek to correct issues with deposit 
insurance itself.  Dodd-Frank also relies on regulatory strategies that have 
proved problematic in the past,288 and its bans on certain types of activities 
contain significant loopholes that may undermine their effectiveness.289 
As described in Part I.A.5, Dodd-Frank altered the way the FDIC 
calculates its premiums.  Proponents believe the new system is beneficial 
because it more accurately reflects risk.290  However, opponents have 
criticized the changes because they disproportionately impact larger 
banks,291 ignoring the fact that smaller banks also played a significant role 
in fueling the 2008 financial crisis.292 
Dodd-Frank and the Basel III regulations293 also required that the United 
States implement new rules for bank capital including increasing capital 
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48703712504576242542837822736.html (“The new assessment was designed to better 
reflect the risks on individual banks’ balance sheets by charging them for liabilities, 
including repo-market activities, instead of just their deposits.”). 
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deposits. See Kim, supra note 290, at 390–91. 
 292. See id. at 393. 
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countries that sets uniform international standards for banking regulation, most notably, 
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to hold more and higher quality capital, and have begun to be implemented in the United 
States by bank regulatory authorities. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Announcing 
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requirements and adjusting formulas.294  Again, the majority of these 
changes were aimed at forcing LCFIs to hold more capital in order to 
ameliorate the problem of TBTF.295  These reforms have also been 
criticized on the grounds that the failure of past capital requirements to 
restrain bank’s risk taking casts doubt on whether these new rules will be 
any more effective than in the past.296 
Dodd-Frank also adjusted the system of granting section 23A waivers by 
requiring notification to the FDIC and OCC of potential waivers, and giving 
those agencies an opportunity to object.  However, Dodd-Frank did not 
make any changes to section 23A to deal with its complexity or the fact that 
banks deliberately violate its prohibitions.297  In addition, there is already 
evidence to suggest that the changes to the waiver system have been 
ineffective.  In 2011, despite the FDIC’s objection, the FRB allowed Bank 
of America (BOA) to move an undisclosed amount of its derivative 
financial instruments from its Merrill Lynch unit to its commercial banking 
subsidiary.298  This allowed BOA to avoid $3.3 billion in collateral 
requirements by transferring the risk of those derivatives to the DIF and 
taking advantage of the FDIC-insured subsidiaries’ higher credit rating.299 
The provisions of Dodd-Frank that have the greatest potential to prevent 
banks from taking advantage of the explicit safety net of deposit insurance 
and moral hazard are the Volcker rule and the Lincoln Amendment.  
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, popularly known as the Volcker rule, prohibits 
banks, their affiliates, and BHCs from engaging in proprietary trading.300 
Proprietary trading occurs when banks buy and sell securities, derivatives, 
and other tradable assets for their own account.301  More specifically, the 
bank uses its balance sheet, partly funded by government-insured deposits, 
to take speculative positions for its own profit.302  Thus, the Volcker rule, 
by banning proprietary trading, seeks to prohibit banks and their affiliates 
from engaging in high-risk speculative activities.303  This means banks and 
their affiliates can no longer take advantage of moral hazard and 
government-subsidized funds to engage in those activities. 
However, the Volcker rule contains a significant loophole, permitting 
banks to engage in “market making”—or the purchase and sale of securities 
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and other instruments on behalf of customers304—as well as risk-mitigating 
hedging activities.305  Distinguishing between banned proprietary trading 
and permitted market making is notoriously difficult, and could potentially 
make it easier for banks to evade the rule.306  Also, as the London Whale 
incident exemplifies, banks can still engage in highly speculative activities 
and make large profits in the name of hedging.307  Indeed, both regulators 
and JP Morgan agreed that the bank’s actions did not violate the Volcker 
rule.308  Lastly, the Volcker rule can also be criticized on the grounds that it 
takes a flawed approach by only altering activities and not incentives, and 
therefore does little to actually prevent banks and FHCs from taking 
excessively damaging risks.309 
The Lincoln Amendment forces FDIC-insured banks to spin off their 
derivative activities, only allowing them to use swaps, a type of derivative, 
for hedging or risk mitigating.310  It also limits the type of swaps to those 
for interest rates, currency rates, and other activities permissible for a bank, 
and only allows credit default swaps that are cleared.311  Yet, the Lincoln 
Amendment also contains significant loopholes.  It allows banks to continue 
trading and dealing in a variety of OTC and other derivatives that are not 
subject to Dodd-Frank’s clearing requirement,312 and grandfathers swaps 
executed through July 2013.313  Some commentators now estimate that the 
Lincoln Amendment will have little impact on the derivatives activities of 
banks and LCFIs.314 
III.  YOU SAY YOU WANT A REAL SOLUTION:  POSSIBILITIES FOR 
SOLVING THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
What Part II reveals is that there is significant evidence that the federally 
subsidized funds provided by deposit insurance helped contribute to the 
2008 financial crisis.  At the same time, Part II.C.3 raises a question as to 
whether the post-2008 reforms actually did anything to solve any of the 
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problems created by deposit insurance.  Accordingly, Part III presents and 
examines a number of reforms that could improve the system of deposit 
insurance in the United States.  The reforms can be broadly separated into 
three categories.  Part III.A covers reforms to deposit insurance itself, Part 
III.B discusses reforms to capital requirements, and Part III.C discusses 
reforms to the organization of the entire financial services industry. 
A.  I Want It That Way:  Reforms to the System of Deposit Insurance Itself 
This Part examines those reforms that would solve the problems created 
by deposit insurance by making legal changes to the operation of deposit 
insurance itself.  Part III.A.1 begins by discussing proposals to improve the 
FDIC’s system of risk-based premiums.  Then, Part III.A.2 analyzes 
reforming deposit insurance through the institution of other market-based 
reforms, including the possibility of eliminating federally sponsored deposit 
insurance. 
1.  I Like Risk-Based Premiums and I Cannot Lie:  How Creating Better 
Risk-Based Premiums Can Solve the Problems of Deposit Insurance 
Of all the ways to deal with the problems created by federally sponsored 
deposit insurance, one of the most obvious is to make adjustments to the 
system itself.  As discussed in Part II, the FDIC currently charges a risk-
based premium as part of its attempt to reduce the ability of banks to take 
advantage of the cheap federally subsidized funds provided by deposit 
insurance, thereby forcing them to internalize the cost of their risk.315  As a 
result, improving this system of premium pricing so that it accurately 
reflects the risk of an institution is one way to mitigate the problems created 
by federally sponsored deposit insurance. 
An improved system of risk-based pricing, which charges banks a 
premium that accurately represents their level of risk, would have a number 
of benefits.  It would force banks to bear the cost of their own risk taking 
and would prevent underpriced insurance from distorting bank managers’ 
incentives.316  It would also reduce the incentive for risk taking generally 
by forcing banks to take risks commensurate with their returns.317 
Several reforms have been proposed to improve the premium system.  
One proposed reform is to charge premiums to banks and LCFIs at the 
holding company level.318  The theory behind such a measure is that it 
would create higher payments for banks that are TBTF and would more 
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accurately represent the cost of their failure.319  Another possible reform 
would be to improve the FDIC premium formula itself.  For example, Viral 
Acharya, Joào Santos, and Tanju Yorulmazer suggest that new factors 
should be added to the risk-based premium formula.320 
Yet another potential reform would be to allow the market to determine 
appropriate premium pricing, instead of the FDIC.  One way to obtain this 
market pricing is through reinsurance.321  A reinsurance scheme in the 
United States could take a variety of forms,322 but it would essentially make 
a third party responsible for a portion of the loss the FDIC would 
experience in a bank failure.323  The value of this reinsurance is not the 
actual insurance it would provide against loss, but instead the market 
information it would provide on the appropriate cost for risk.324  The FDIC 
could then use this data directly to formulate a more accurate risk-based 
premium.  Alternatively, the FDIC could pass the cost of reinsurance 
directly on to a bank, resulting in an additional payment for the bank that is 
based on the market’s assessment of its risk, essentially a more accurate 
risk-based premium.325 
Utilizing the markets to create risk-based premiums has clear benefits.  
Regulatory agencies like the FDIC inherently struggle to create accurate 
risk-based premiums because they are not subject to market discipline, lack 
experience, and are vulnerable to political pressure and industry 
lobbying.326  However, a reinsurance model may also struggle to provide 
accurate risk-based premiums for two reasons.  First, firms entering the 
deposit reinsurance market will, in the short run, lack the data and 
experience to create effective premiums.327  Second, the accuracy of pricing 
may be negatively impacted by the expectation that regulators and the 
government will step in to save a bank that is TBTF.328 
Overall, this underscores the larger problem with creating better risk-
based premiums:  it is easier said than done.  Accurately calculating and 
assessing risk is difficult, and thus so is creating a better system of 
calculating premiums.329  Additionally, even if the FDIC had access to 
market-based information from reinsurance, it may still be difficult to create 
 
 319. See Hein, Koch & Nounamo, supra note 318, at 31–34. 
 320. Acharya, Santos & Yorulmazer, supra note 86, at 97.  Specifically, they suggest 
adding metrics that account for systemic risk and the factors that cause it, such as bank 
interconnectedness and the costs of resolution. See id. 
 321. See Walker, supra note 317, at 739. 
 322. See id. at 744–55. 
 323. See id. at 741. 
 324. See id. at 740. 
 325. See id. at 740–41. 
 326. See id. at 739–40. 
 327. See id. at 775–77 (noting that, regardless of initial difficulties, “the private sector’s 
greater incentive to correlate risk and price, even with facility merely equal to the public 
sector, will lead to improvements over the current FDIC pricing system”). 
 328. See id. at 789. 
 329. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 329;  Acharya, Santos & Yorulmazer, supra 
note 86, at 90. 
2013] THE FLAWED EXPLICIT SAFETY NET 1269 
a more accurate risk-based formula.330  Thus, creating a more accurate risk-
based premium may be desirable to reduce the subsidy that deposit 
insurance gives to banks, but it may not be accomplishable.331 
2.  Living La Vida Free Market:  Reducing the Subsidy by Eliminating It:  
Expanded Coinsurance or Ending Deposit Insurance 
Another possible way to fix the system of deposit insurance is to reduce 
the level of coverage.  More specifically, the government could expand the 
use of coinsurance or eliminate federally sponsored deposit insurance 
entirely.  A system of expanded coinsurance would limit the availability of 
deposit insurance by either lowering the overall insured amount, or making 
some percentage less than 100 percent of the insured amount available to 
depositors in the event of a bank failure.332  In fact, the original deposit 
insurance plan, outlined in the Banking Act of 1933, contemplated such a 
scheme.  It provided 100 percent protection of the first $10,000 of each 
depositor, 75 percent coverage of the next $40,000 of deposits, and 50 
percent coverage of all deposits in excess of $50,000.333  Currently, 
depositors with deposits up to $250,000 are subject to no coinsurance, as 
their deposits are 100 percent insured.334 
The other possibility is to discontinue federally sponsored deposit 
insurance.  However, this does not necessarily mean that depositors would 
be left unprotected.  Depositors could safely invest their savings in money 
market funds invested in Treasury bills or highly rated commercial 
paper.335  In addition, as Charles Calomiris suggests, banks could operate 
insurance programs among themselves, and the government could regulate 
these insurance programs.336 
The benefit of limiting or eliminating deposit insurance is that it would 
prevent moral hazard by incentivizing depositors to monitor banks’ 
activities.337  Depositors would then demand higher interest rates to place 
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their money in banks that engage in risky activities.338  The result would be 
greater market discipline.339  Banks would lose the federal subsidy that 
allows them to raise cheap funds,340 making certain high-risk activities less 
profitable.  Similarly, a renewed fear of bank runs would incentivize banks 
to avoid excessive risk.341 
However, there are several potential problems created by reducing or 
eliminating deposit insurance.  First, depositors may not be capable of 
fulfilling the monitoring role that this system requires to function 
effectively.342  They may lack the time, inclination, or skill to evaluate the 
safety of their banks.343  Second, such a system may leave unsophisticated 
depositors vulnerable to losing their entire life savings.344  Lastly, a system 
of depositor monitoring may detract from overall economic stability.  
Depositors’ reliance on imperfect information could initiate panicked mass 
withdrawals, closing perfectly healthy banks and possibly initiating an 
overall economic crisis.345 
Reducing or eliminating deposit insurance therefore presents a difficult 
choice.346  Limiting or removing deposit insurance may create harmful 
bank runs and system fragility, but could incentivize banks to avoid high-
risk activity.347  Conversely, keeping deposit insurance at its current level 
eliminates bank runs and provides stability, but will decrease market 
discipline.348  However, the scale between these competing choices may be 
tipped towards the side of reducing coverage if one finds deposit insurance 
fails to provide its stated benefits. 
There is growing evidence that deposit insurance may not prevent bank 
runs or contribute to economic stability.  For example, one study recently 
concluded that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing 
bank runs, and that instead stronger and longer relationships between 
depositors and their banks may be more effective.349  In fact, other 
countries have still experienced bank runs despite having deposit insurance 
systems.350  Similarly, other researchers have presented evidence that not 
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only does deposit insurance fail to create economic stability, but instead 
leads to instability over the long term.351 
Yet, even if empirical research demonstrates that federally sponsored 
deposit insurance does not provide its promised benefits, reducing or 
eliminating it may still not be a viable reform.  Whether people understand 
it or not, deposit insurance enjoys substantial support from the public.352  
Accordingly, politicians would be unlikely to support its shrinking or 
elimination, and a reform of this type may be impossible.353 
B.  Hold on for One More Day:  Improving Capital Requirements 
As mentioned briefly in Part II, capital requirements are one way in 
which the United States attempts to contain the problems created by having 
a deposit insurance system.354  Banks can finance their purchase of assets 
through capital/equity or debt (an example of which is deposits).355  Absent 
deposit insurance, banks would be limited in their ability to finance asset 
purchases through debt/deposits because as they used more debt, debt 
holders and depositors would demand higher interest rates.356  However, 
deposit insurance prevents depositors from demanding higher interest rates, 
removes that limitation, and does so at cost to the government.357  Capital 
requirements force banks to support their operations and asset purchases 
with certain amounts of equity,358 and thereby try to correct this issue.359  
Thus, they reduce the ability of banks to take advantage of deposits as 
cheap federally subsidized funds. 
Furthermore, capital requirements reduce the likelihood that banks will 
fail.  By ensuring that banks have a certain amount of resources on hand, 
capital requirements seek to ensure that banks remain solvent in times of 
 
their deposit insurance coverage. See Michiel Bijlsma & Karen van der Wiel, Consumer 
Protection of Deposit Insurance:  Little Awareness, Limited Effectiveness? 22 (Tilburg Law 
and Economics Center, Discussion Paper No. 2012-013, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034186 (finding that Dutch depositors 
lacked detailed knowledge and trust in their deposit system). 
 351. See Chu, supra note 237, at 277 (concluding that deposit insurance does not make 
the occurrence of bank crises less likely in the long run, and may actually increase that 
likeliness); Chu, supra note 232, at 110 (finding that low coverage schemes are more likely 
to have no banking crises); see also Kaufman, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that before the 
advent of the explicit safety net and deposit insurance, banks in the United States actually 
held higher capital ratios, assumed less risks, and failed slightly less than nonbank firms). 
 352. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 331 (describing how limiting deposit 
insurance is “beyond the political pale”). 
 353. See id.; see also Kaufman, supra note 30, at 28 (assuming that government provided 
deposit insurance, in some form, is a political fact of life). 
 354. See supra Part II.A. 
 355. See George J. Benston, The Purpose of Capital for Institutions with Government-
Insured Desposits, 5 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 369, 373–74 (1992). 
 356. Id. 
 357. See supra Part II. 
 358. Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards:  A Legitimate Regulatory Control 
for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1313 (1989). 
 359. See Gubler, supra note 231, at 234. 
1272 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
economic turmoil.360  This reduces both the risk to the DIF361 and the 
possibility that a bailout will be necessary.362 
Lastly, capital requirements also have an impact on bank managers’ 
incentives to engage in certain activities.  Capital requirements force bank 
owners and managers to have more of their own money at risk.363  This 
reduces their incentive to engage in high-risk and potentially harmful 
activities, including those that could exacerbate the problems at an already 
troubled bank.364  In addition, it imposes an additional market test on bank 
managers.  While they may not have to convince depositors that their 
institution is safe, they will need to convince investors in order to continue 
the bank’s operations in that particular activity.365 
Because of these benefits, both Dodd-Frank and Basel III sought to 
improve and increase banks’ capital requirements.366  Additionally, several 
other proposals have recommended increasing capital requirements even 
further.  The one most likely to become law is a regulation jointly proposed 
by the FDIC, OCC, and FRB in July of 2013.367  The proposed regulation 
calls for the eight largest LCFIs368 in the United States to hold greater 
levels of capital at both the holding company level and in their FDIC-
insured subsidiary banks.369  Meanwhile, Senators David Vitter and 
Sherrod Brown have proposed an even more aggressive approach.370  Their 
bill would require LCFIs to increase their equity capital to 15 percent of 
assets, but is unlikely to pass.371 
Merely increasing capital requirements, however, may not be enough to 
contain the risk taking of banks and LCFIs when supported by federally 
subsidized funds.  First, capital is a lagging indicator of problems, and may 
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not accurately demonstrate that a bank is engaged in troubling activity.372  
Indeed, a bank may appear capitalized on paper but still be heading for 
insolvency.373  Second, the amount and quality of capital is difficult to 
calculate.374  Judging an asset’s value is inherently difficult due to general 
problems with accounting principles, the ability of banks to delay the 
recognition of losses in financial reports, and the inability of regulators to 
accurately calculate the value of assets themselves.375 
Lastly, higher capital requirements may have negative economic 
implications of their own.  Higher capital requirements can restrain a bank’s 
profitability and growth capabilities.376  Analysts have already predicted 
that the regulation proposed by the FDIC, OCC, and FRB will further dilute 
banks’ returns,377 could cause banks to leave certain industries, and may 
limit the availability of credit in the United States.378  However, other 
analysts have challenged these assertions, citing how profitable banks have 
been since the imposition of new regulations after 2008.379  In the case of 
the more aggressive bill proposed by Senators Vitter and Brown, the loss of 
profit would have an even more substantial effect—it would likely cause 
the largest LCFIs to break up.380 
C.  You Came in Like a Wrecking Ball:  Reforms to the  
Organization of the Entire Financial Services Industry 
Part III.C analyzes proposed reforms that would ameliorate the problems 
created by deposit insurance by reforming the structure of the entire 
financial system.  Part III.C.1 discusses proposals that seek to separate 
commercial banks from investment banks, prevent the affiliations that allow 
for the existence of LCFIs, and essentially reenact the GSA.  Part III.C.2 
reviews proposals that would severely limit the types of financial activities 
that insured depository institutions could engage in, but that, in many cases, 
would not limit their ability to affiliate with other financial firms and form 
LCFIs. 
1.  Party in the GSA:  A Return to Glass-Steagall-Type Prohibitions 
While the ultimate effect of the legislation proposed by Senators Vitter 
and Brown may be the breaking up of LCFIs, others have proposed a more 
 
 372. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 337. 
 373. See id. at 351. 
 374. See Norton, supra note 358, at 1361. 
 375. See Carnell, supra note 88, at 351.  Basel III did attempt to solve some of these 
problems, as demonstrated by the implementing regulations promulgated in the United 
States. See Press Release, supra note 293.  However, past Basel accords, regardless of their 
reforms, have proved to be ineffective at preventing financial crisis. See Lyngen, supra note 
293, at 526. 
 376. See Norton, supra note 358, at 1313. 
 377. See Triumph of Low Expectations, supra note 367, at 61–62. 
 378. Peter Eavis, Rising Bank Profits Tempt a Push for Tougher Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2013, at B8. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
1274 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
direct approach.  In an effort to fix the problems created by section 23A 
(and prevent LCFIs from using the cheap federally subsidized funds in their 
FDIC-insured subsidiaries to fund activities in other riskier subsidiaries),381 
several legislators have proposed reinstating the GSA.382  These proposals 
all differ somewhat in their details, yet they all would prevent FDIC-insured 
banks from affiliating with securities firms and would inevitably shrink 
LCFIs and FHCs.383 
Proponents of reinstating the GSA384 argue it would have two benefits.  
First, fully separating commercial banks from other more speculative 
institutions is a simpler system to administer.  It would be substantially 
more straightforward than the Volcker rule,385 and given that affiliate 
transactions are difficult to police, preventing affiliation would ensure that 
the federal subsidy would not spread.386  Second, it would promote 
macroeconomic stability.  By separating banking institutions that are 
essential to the economy from the risky endeavors of more speculative 
affiliates, stability is increased by limiting banks’ exposure to risk.387  To 
support this theory, proponents like Senator Elizabeth Warren have cited to 
history, noting how the combination of deposit insurance, strict GSA 
prohibitions, and SEC regulations provided fifty years of financial stability 
before the GSA was impacted by deregulation.388 
However, opponents of reinstating the GSA have questioned whether the 
GSA actually contributed to macroeconomic stability when it was in effect.  
Several studies have concluded that the activities the GSA was intended to 
prevent (securities activities by commercial banks) had no impact on 
causing the Great Depression.389  Opponents instead claim that GSA’s 
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separation of commercial banks from investment banks reflected the views 
of key politicians and not what was empirically beneficial to the 
economy.390  To the extent that the GSA had any positive impact at all, 
opponents argue that it only did so because the United States was 
entrenched in such a serious financial crisis that bold moves were the only 
way to bring back public confidence.391 
Opponents also argue that reinstating the GSA would hurt bank profits 
and have a negative effect on the overall economy.  Banks have consistently 
insisted that their size, ability to affiliate, and ability to engage in an 
expanded range of activities allows them to be more profitable.392  This was 
part of the justification for ending the GSA in the first place.393  Thus, 
opponents argue that reenacting the GSA, and forcing LCFIs to separate, 
may make banks less profitable and create some measure of economic 
harm.394 
Overall, even if the GSA was reenacted, there is nothing to guarantee 
that, like the original GSA, it would not be subject to the same slow erosion 
as the turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis fades into memory.395  
Additionally, while the goal of reinstating the GSA is to create 
macroeconomic stability, it seeks to do so by breaking up LCFIs and ending 
the implicit safety net of TBTF.396  It would do little to prevent insured 
banks themselves from continuing to take advantage of deposit insurance to 
engage in many of the highly speculative activities, including derivatives 
trading, that are permitted as part of the business of banking.397 
2.  I Would Do Anything for Profit, but I Can’t Do That:  Narrow Banking 
and Only Allowing Banking at a Bank 
Another approach that would involve substantial legal changes to the 
entire financial services industry would be instituting a system of narrow 
banking.  Broadly speaking, in a system of narrow banking, FDIC-insured 
banks would only be permitted to hold deposits and invest in safe assets.398  
Under Professor Arthur Wilmarth’s narrow-banking proposal, there would 
be two tiers of narrow banks.399  First-tier narrow banks would be those that 
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were not part of a financial holding company, mostly small community 
banks.400  These banks would be permitted to take deposits and engage in a 
broad range of other banking-related services.401  They would have the 
ability to purchase derivatives as end users, but only to hedge against 
risk.402  Second-tier narrow banks would be those FDIC-insured banks that 
are affiliated with FHCs, and would consist of the United States’ largest 
banking organizations.403  These banks would be permitted to take deposits, 
but would hold all of their assets as short-term securities that could be 
marked to market, and would essentially operate as money market mutual 
funds.404  These banks would be prohibited from extending any credit or 
transferring any funds to their FHC affiliates.405  Also, like the first-tier 
narrow banks, these banks would be prohibited from dealing in derivatives, 
except to purchase them as end users to hedge against risk.406 
Sheila Bair, the former chairman of the FDIC, has advocated for a similar 
system.  In her book Bull by the Horns, she proposes that insured depository 
institutions that are subsidiaries of LCFIs should only be used to support 
traditional banking operations.407  She would then require that all 
nontraditional banking activities be conducted in other LCFI affiliates that 
are not in any way supported by insured deposits.408 
The overall result is that narrow banking would force LCFIs to rely on 
uninsured debt and equity rather than on less expensive federally insured 
deposits.409  Proponents argue that this would ensure that LCFIs cannot 
exploit the federal subsidy to engage in speculative activities either within 
their banks or affiliated financial entities,410 and would force LCFIs and 
banks to prove that their speculative activities actually provided worthwhile 
returns.411  Ultimately, if the LCFIs that relied on these activities could not 
prove their profitability, they would be forced to break up, and in turn, also 
reduce the implicit subsidy created by TBTF.412 
The primary problem with narrow banking is that it may have adverse 
economic effects.  Narrow banks may make credit less available for 
individuals and businesses, as banks may become less willing to originate 
and hold illiquid assets.413  Also, narrow banking, by restricting a bank to 
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holding safe assets, would reduce its rate of return and shrink its net 
income.414  Lastly, the other problem with narrow banking is that it would 
be a radical change.415  It would drastically alter the way that banks operate 
in the economy and in society,416 and this may make it politically 
impossible. 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?:  CREATING A MODERN DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC STABILITY AND 
PROTECT DEPOSITORS 
Ultimately, the reforms that this Note advocates for are those that 
acknowledge the realities of the modern financial system in the United 
States and deal with the problems created by deposit insurance by relying 
on the power of the free market.  Part IV.A discusses why such reforms are 
preferable.  Part IV.B then articulates the specific reforms to the law that 
this Note advocates. 
A.  Don’t Stop Believing:  Why Market-Oriented Reforms Should Be 
Enacted To Solve the Problems Created by Deposit Insurance 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and the bailouts of LCFIs 
that came with it, the public and politicians understandably expressed a 
desire to end the implicit subsidy provided by TBTF that motivated LCFIs 
to take the excessive risks that ultimately wrecked the economy.417  Since 
then, Dodd-Frank, the regulations promulgated in its wake, and several 
other proposals to fix the U.S. financial system have all focused on that 
goal.418  However, if the problem with the implicit safety net of TBTF is 
that it gives LCFIs the incentive to engage in highly speculative activities, 
then the problem with deposit insurance and the explicit safety net is that it 
gives LCFIs the cheap funds to help make those speculative activities 
profitable.419  Thus, this Note advocates first and foremost for reforms that 
equally address that issue as much as TBTF. 
In many ways, the operation of federally sponsored deposit insurance in 
the United States represents an antiquated system.  Founded in 1933, the 
FDIC was established during a much different time where the GSA 
prevented banks from being affiliated with securities firms,420 the business 
of banking did not include complex derivatives,421 the LCFIs that dominate 
today’s financial landscape did not exist,422 and indeed, the financial 
industry itself was much simpler.  The United States has taken some strides 
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to adjust deposit insurance and financial regulation to the realities of 
modern times, including implementing risk-based premiums, requiring least 
cost resolution methods,423 and giving the FDIC the power of the OLA to 
take over and resolve failing LCFIs.424 
However, even recent reforms to the system of financial regulation seem 
to have done little to limit LCFIs from engaging in speculative activity and 
taking advantage of the cheap federally subsidized funds provided by 
deposit insurance.425  Section 23A remains difficult to enforce.  Its waiver 
system is seemingly still vulnerable, and thus it is largely ineffective in 
preventing LCFIs from taking advantage of insured deposits to support the 
activities of nonbank affiliates.426  The Lincoln Amendment will change 
little of what insured depository institutions are permitted to do with 
derivatives.427  The Volcker rule, with many of its implementing 
regulations still unfinished as of this writing, is still unlikely to stop banks 
from gambling with insured deposits and turning a profit, while nominally 
calling it hedging risk, as exemplified by the London Whale incident.428 
What, then, is the answer?  Many believe that reenacting the GSA or 
significantly raising capital requirements would help prevent LCFIs from 
engaging in high-risk activities and utilizing federally subsidized 
deposits.429  But such reforms are not without cost.430  While banks have 
demonstrated an ability to remain profitable in the wake of all the 
regulations passed since 2008, their warnings of a potential loss in profits 
may not just be exaggeration.431  Whether they are politically popular or 
not, banks and LCFIs are integral parts of the nation’s economy.432  Cutting 
back their profits too much, even in the name of protecting the financial 
system and creating a more stable economy, would, in the long run, benefit 
no one. 
As an alternative, this Note advocates for letting the market decide what 
activities are most profitable for LCFIs.  No longer should federally 
subsidized funds support highly speculative activities by allowing them to 
be profitable.  No longer should regulators debate what activities LCFIs 
should or should not be engaged in.  Thinking logically, the easiest way to 
eliminate the federal subsidy provided by deposit insurance and increase 
market discipline would be to eliminate deposit insurance, but there are 
many reasons this is an unacceptable choice politically, socially, and 
economically.433  Instead, this Note advocates for several reforms that 
should be made to decrease the federal subsidy provided by deposit 
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insurance and increase market discipline on banks and LCFIs.  Principally, 
this Note recommends a system requiring narrow depository institutions, 
and if that is politically unattainable, the institution of coinsurance and a 
prefunded OLF. 
B.  Give It to Me Baby:  What a Modern System Should Look Like 
Echoing the proposal by Sheila Bair in her book Bull by the Horns, 
LCFIs should be permitted to own insured depository institutions, but they 
should only be permitted to operate narrowly as commercial banks 
conducting traditional banking activities like lending.434  All of an LCFI’s 
securities, derivative, and other speculative activities should be conducted 
in separate affiliates.435  There should be an ironclad ban on transactions 
between insured depository institution affiliates and other affiliates in an 
LCFI,436 with no possibility of waiver.  This would prevent the problems 
that have plagued section 23A, and ensure that insured deposits are never 
allowed to support highly speculative activities.  Lastly, in order to continue 
to aid the competitiveness of community banks, insured depository 
institutions that are not part of LCFIs should be permitted to engage in a 
limited number of nontraditional bank activities.437 
This system would end the ability of banks to utilize cheap federally 
subsidized deposits to fund and profit from speculative activities.438  LCFIs 
will be forced instead to attract funding from private investors who will 
charge an interest rate commensurate to the level of risk of the activity.439  
Thus, banks and LCFIs will only be able to engage in highly speculative 
activities if they and their investors decide those activities truly are 
profitable. 
While a system of narrow depository institutions would be the best 
solution to solve the problems created by deposit insurance, it also 
represents a radical legal change.440  Therefore, instituting narrow banking 
may be politically impossible.  Given that reality, this Note also 
recommends two smaller reforms that would require little change to the 
law, but could also substantively improve the system. 
First, the FDIC should adopt a system of coinsurance, as was originally 
contemplated in the Banking Act of 1933.441  For example, deposits of 
$0.01–$50,000.00 would be 100 percent insured, deposits from 
$50,000.01–$150,000.00 would be 50 percent insured, and deposits from 
$150,000.01–$250,000.00 would be 25 percent insured.  This would force 
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depositors to have a greater interest in monitoring442 their banks, and in 
turn, subject banks and LCFIs to slightly greater discipline.443  If depositors 
are concerned they will lose part of their money, they will be more likely to 
remove it if they become concerned with a bank’s health, and this will force 
banks to either take on less risk or pay higher interest rates to compensate 
depositors for that risk.444  At the same time, because much of their money 
is still protected, coinsurance should insure against mass panics that would 
cause bank runs445 and protect highly unsophisticated depositors.446 
Second, the DIF should be eliminated, and the resolutions of both banks 
and SIFIs should be financed through a new prefunded OLF.  Under this 
system, covered financial institutions (SIFIs and commercial banks) would 
make a yearly payment to the FDIC that represents a percentage of what it 
would cost to resolve the institution if it failed.  All payments to the OLF 
would be made at the holding company level.447  This means banks that are 
part of a SIFI will not have to make a separate payment, but that LCFIs, 
who have not been designated as SIFIs, but operate a commercial bank, will 
have to pay at the holding company level for the potential resolution of the 
entire LCFI.448  Thus, the focus will no longer be solely on commercial 
banks, but on the truly important institutions whose failure actually presents 
the greatest risk to the financial sector and the economy, and will force 
them to internalize the costs of their risk, not the taxpayers.449  This will 
also capture the reality that many SIFIs and LCFIs flout the rules of section 
23A and take advantage of the federal subsidy provided by deposit 
insurance to their affiliate commercial banks.450 
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CONCLUSION 
Too often, the debate on reform has been dominated by concern over 
TBTF, bailouts, and implicit government guarantees.451  This is not to say 
that those issues are unimportant.  However, while the public and 
politicians continue to debate TBTF, deposit insurance continues to provide 
a subsidy to banks and LCFIs that allows them to artificially create profits 
by engaging in speculative activities.  Indeed, analysts may someday look 
back at these very activities as the cause of the next financial crisis. 
To solve this problem, this Note proposes a system of narrow depository 
institutions.  This proposal would involve substantial changes to the law 
and the practices of LCFIs, but narrow banking is the most direct way to 
pry the mouths of LCFIs off the faucet of cheap federally subsidized funds, 
while at the same time protecting depositors.  Yet, as political gridlock in 
Washington makes wholesale change increasingly unlikely, this Note also 
proposes smaller measures to improve the current system:  coinsurance and 
prefunding the OLF with assessments charged to bank and SIFI holding 
companies.  While these reforms would not solve the problems created by 
deposit insurance entirely, they would be an important first step towards 
creating a safer financial system in the United States.  In other words, if the 
mouths of LCFIs cannot be ripped off the faucet of cheap federally 
subsidized funds, the United States should at least make the water taste a 
little more bitter. 
 
 
 451. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text. 
